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ABSTRACT. It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of 
contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-
problems⎯a formulation that turns on the closure principle, and a second formulation which 
turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of 
rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal⎯at least when properly 
formulated⎯can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that 
this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The 
antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere⎯with, it is suggested, 
epistemological disjunctivism.   
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1. TWO FORMULATIONS OF RADICAL SCEPTICISM 
 
The contemporary literature on radical scepticism tends to run together two formulations of the 
problem.1 On the one hand, we have a closure-based formulation of this problem, which treats 
radical scepticism as essentially trading on a principle concerning how knowledge is transferred 
across competent deductions. On the other hand, we have an underdetermination-based formulation 
of this problem, which instead treats scepticism as essentially trading on the claim that (roughly) 
agents in normal conditions have no better rational support for their beliefs than their 
                                                
1  Note that by ‘radical scepticism’ here I mean specifically the kind of Cartesian scepticism which is the focus of 
much of the contemporary epistemological debate. For more on contemporary treatments of radical scepticism, see 
Pritchard (2002; 2010).  
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counterparts in sceptical scenarios. These two formulations of radical scepticism generate the same 
sceptical conclusion and seem to be so closely related that it can seem almost pedantic to keep 
them apart. And yet, as I will argue in this section, it is vital that we do so. In order to see this, we 
first need to revisit these arguments and their moving parts.  
 We begin with the closure-based formulation of the sceptical problem, since this has now 
become the most common formulation of the problem in the literature. We will focus our 
attention on rationally grounded knowledge, in order to side-step issues that might arise with 
knowledge which lacks a rational grounding.2 In order to simplify things, we will formulate the 
sceptical problem as it concerns an agent’s rationally grounded knowledge of an ‘everyday’ 
empirical proposition (‘E’), the kind of proposition which is typically thought to be known, and 
where the belief in question is regarded as rationally grounded. If one has rationally grounded 
knowledge of these everyday empirical propositions, then the challenge posed by radical 
scepticism is illusory. We will also focus on a specific radical sceptical hypothesis which is by 
stipulation incompatible with E⎯viz., the hypothesis that, unbeknownst to one, one is a brain-in-
a-vat (BIV) being ‘fed’ one’s experiences by supercomputers.  
 With these stipulations in mind, here is the closure-based radical sceptical paradox: 
 
The Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(S11) One cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. 
(S12) If one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, then one cannot 
have rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S13) I have rationally grounded knowledge that E.3 
 
(S11) is motivated by the general thought that one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that 
one is not the victim of a radical sceptical hypothesis. Given that, ex hypothesi, one cannot 
distinguish between one’s ordinary experiences and the corresponding experiences that one would 
have if one were a BIV, then how could one have a rational basis for knowing that one is not a 
BIV?4 (S13) is motivated by the general anti-sceptical thought noted above that E-type 
propositions are widely known, where this knowledge is rationally grounded. 
 That leaves us with the second claim, (S12). This is motivated by appeal to the following 
principle:    
                                                
2  For further discussion of why the sceptical problem is best understood in terms of rationally grounded knowledge, 
see Pritchard (2015a, part one).  
3  Note that this formulation of radical scepticism is in fact much stronger than we need to generate the sceptical 
paradox. In particular, in terms of (S11), it would suffice, for example, that one does not⎯as opposed to the stronger 
cannot⎯have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S12) that it follows 
from one’s lack of rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge 
that E.  
4  Note that in order to keep matters simple I am setting to one side those responses to radical scepticism⎯e.g., Vogel 
(1990)⎯which claim that we have an abductive rational basis for preferring our everyday beliefs over sceptical 
alternatives. I critically discuss such a proposal in Pritchard (2015a, ch. 1). 
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The Closure Principle  
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby 
forming a belief that q on this basis while retaining her rationally grounded knowledge that p, then 
S has rationally grounded knowledge that q. 
 
With the closure principle in play, it follows that if one did have rationally grounded knowledge 
that E, then one could competently deduce from this knowledge that one is not a BIV, and 
thereby acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV.5 Conversely, if it is already 
granted that one simply cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV, it 
follows that one cannot have rationally grounded knowledge that E either. We thus get (S12). 
The guiding thought behind the closure principle is that competent deduction is a 
paradigm instance of a rational process. Accordingly, any belief which is grounded on a competent 
deduction from rationally grounded knowledge⎯and where the original rationally grounded 
knowledge is preserved throughout the deduction⎯cannot be itself any less rationally grounded. 
There are, of course, weaker formulations of closure-style principles in this general vein in the 
literature, and some of them have been rejected for various reasons.6 But it is hard to see how one 
could motivate a rejection of the principle as just formulated. How could one have rationally 
grounded knowledge, competently deduce a belief on this basis (while retaining the original 
rationally grounded knowledge), and yet lack rationally grounded knowledge of the proposition 
deduced? At the very least, any anti-sceptical strategy which proceeds by rejecting this principle 
will face a steep up-hill task.   
 Since the three claims that make up this paradox are in logical conflict with one another, so 
we know that at least one of them must be false. But since they are all highly intuitive, or at least 
supported by highly intuitive claims (such as the closure principle), it is hard to see which is to go.  
Next, consider the second way of expressing the radical sceptical paradox, which turns on 
the underdetermination principle: 
 
The Underdetermination-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(S21) One cannot have a rational basis which favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario. 
(S22) If one cannot have a rational basis which favours one’s belief that E over the BIV 
scenario, then one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
(S23) I have rationally grounded knowledge that E.7 
                                                
5  Note that here, and in what follows, we are taking it as given that one knows that E entails that one is not a BIV.  
6  In particular, the most famous rejections of closure-style principles as a means of blocking radical scepticism⎯due 
to Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981)⎯have been concerned with much weaker formulations of the closure principle, 
and hence do not straightforwardly apply to the closure principle as we have formulated it here. For a useful recent 
exchange on the status of closure-style principles, see Dretske (2005a; 2005b) and Hawthorne (2005).  
7  As with our formulation of the closure-based radical sceptical paradox above⎯see footnote 3⎯note that this 
formulation of radical scepticism is in fact much stronger than we need to generate the sceptical paradox. In particular, 
in terms of (S21), it would suffice, for example, that one does not⎯as opposed to the stronger cannot⎯have a rational 
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As with the closure-based formulation of the radical sceptical paradox, these three claims are 
clearly in logical conflict, and hence we know that at least one of them must be false. The final 
claim that makes up the underdetermination-based radical sceptical paradox is identical to the final 
claim that makes up the closure-based radical sceptical paradox, so we can focus our attention on 
the other two.  
The first claim, (S21), captures a widely held commitment in epistemology to the so-called 
new evil demon intuition. Consider two agents. The first is in normal epistemic conditions⎯call this 
the good case. The second, in contrast, is an identical counterpart of the first but unfortunately the 
victim of a radical sceptical hypothesis (such as the BIV hypothesis)⎯call this the bad case. It is by 
stipulation impossible for either subject to distinguish between their experiences and those had by 
their counterpart. The new evil demon intuition is the claim that the first agent in the good case 
cannot have a better rational basis for her beliefs than her counterpart in the bad case does for her 
corresponding beliefs. After all, given that the good and bad cases are indistinguishable to the 
subjects concerned, how could the agent in the good case have a better rational standing for her 
beliefs than her counterpart in the bad case?8  
The second claim in the underdetermination-based formulation of radical scepticism, (S22), 
is meant to be derived from the following underdetermination principle: 
 
The Underdetermination Principle 
If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis which 
favours belief that p over q, then S lacks rationally grounded knowledge that p. 
 
With this principle in play, it follows that if one lacks a rational basis which favours E over the 
BIV alternative, then one lacks rationally support knowledge that E. We thus get (S22). 
 The underdetermination principle is meant to be entirely uncontentious. Consider what it 
would mean for it to be false. This would entail that one could have rationally grounded 
knowledge of a proposition even while recognising that the proposition believed was incompatible 
with an alternative scenario and that one’s rational basis for one’s belief didn’t favour it over the 
alternative scenario. An example might be having rationally grounded knowledge that one is seated 
even while recognising that one has no better reason for thinking that one is seated than that one 
is standing (a known to be incompatible alternative). Although there might be some dispute over 
what is involved in having rationally grounded knowledge, we would surely want a conception of 
                                                                                                                                                     
basis which favours one’s belief that E over the BIV scenario. Relatedly, it would suffice for (S22) that it follows from 
one’s lack of such a favouring rational basis that one lacks rationally grounded knowledge that E. 
8  The loci classici as regards the new evil demon intuition are Lehrer & Cohen (1983) and Cohen (1984). For a helpful 
general discussion of the new evil demon intuition and its epistemological significance, see Littlejohn (2009). See also 
Bach (1985) and Engel (1992).  
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this kind of knowledge such that it excluded this possibility.  
 These two formulations of the radical sceptical paradox are clearly very similar. They share a 
claim, and the sceptical challenge posed in each case is the same. Moreover, they can each be 
formulated in terms of a conflict between our rationally grounded knowledge of an everyday 
proposition, E, and an epistemic lack which is exposed by radical sceptical hypotheses, in this case 
the BIV hypothesis. Crucially, however, these two formulations of the sceptical problem are 
logically distinct, and this is because the epistemic demands made by the two epistemic principles 
on which they turn are subtly different.  
 We can evaluate the relative logical strengths of these two epistemic principles by 
considering, in a simplified and analogous fashion, what each principle demands in the particular 
case of a subject’s belief that E in the context of the BIV sceptical hypothesis: 
 
The Simplified Closure-Based Entailment 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that E, then S has rationally grounded knowledge that she 
is not a BIV. 
 
The Simplified Underdetermination-Based Entailment 
If S has rationally grounded knowledge that E, then S has rational support for her belief that E 
which favours that belief over the sceptical alternative that she is a BIV. 
 
I take it that the simplified closure-based entailment is an obvious, and uncontentious, 
simplification of what the closure principle demands in this case. That the simplified 
underdetermination-based entailment is a simplification of what the underdetermination principle 
demands is not so obvious, but that is because we are effectively working with a contraposed 
version of the principle. Uncontraposed, the entailment would be that if one lacks a rational basis 
which favours belief that E over the alternative sceptical scenario that one is a BIV, then one lacks 
rationally grounded knowledge that E. The reason why it is useful to work with a contraposed 
version of this claim is that the underdetermination-based entailment will then share its antecedent 
with the simplified closure-based entailment. We can thus focus our attention on what is entailed 
in each case.   
With the entailments generated by the underdetermination and closure principles 
simplified in this way, we can detect one obvious difference between them. This is that whereas 
the simplified closure-based entailment demands that one has rationally grounded knowledge that 
one is not a BIV, the simplified underdetermination-based entailment merely demands that one has 
a rational basis which favours belief that E over the BIV alternative. The former claim is much 
more demanding than the latter claim, in that one can have better reasons for believing E rather 
than the BIV hypothesis without thereby possessing rationally grounded knowledge that one is not 
a BIV. In particular, while having better reason to believe that E as opposed to the BIV hypothesis 
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plausibly entails that one has some reason for believing that one is not a BIV, it would be a stretch 
to maintain that this by itself entails that one has rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV 
(even granted that the entailed belief in question will be true). There is thus a strong prima facie 
basis for arguing that the underdetermination principle is logically weaker than the closure 
principle, in the sense that from the same antecedent the former principle extracts a logically 
weaker consequent. 
This point is confirmed once we reflect on the logical relationships in the other 
direction⎯viz., from the closure principle to the underdetermination principle. For notice that if 
one has rationally grounded knowledge that E, and one thereby has rationally grounded 
knowledge, via the closure principle, that one is not a BIV, then of course one inevitably has a 
rational basis for which favours E over the alternative sceptical scenario that is a BIV. One has, 
after all, rationally grounded knowledge that one is not a BIV. The closure principle is thus more 
demanding that the underdetermination principle.  
 Given the logical differences between these two ways of arguing for radical scepticism, we 
cannot take it as given that a response to the one formulation of the sceptical problem is thereby a 
response to the other formulation of the problem. Indeed, we cannot even take it as given that any 
adequate response to the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox is thereby an adequate 
response to the closure-based radical sceptical paradox. True, it does follow from the fact that the 
closure principle entails the underdetermination principle that a rejection of the latter would entail 
a rejection of the former. Hence, any response to the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox 
which involved a rejection of the underdetermination principle would thereby be a response to 
closure-based scepticism. But notice that this claim falls well short of the more general thesis that 
any adequate treatment of the underdetermination-based sceptical paradox is thereby an adequate 
treatment of the closure-based sceptical paradox. After all, one could respond to the former 
sceptical paradox in a way that keeps the underdetermination principle intact, and clearly this 
manner of dealing with underdetermination-based scepticism might have no obvious ramifications 
for how one should respond to the closure-based sceptical paradox. The point thus remains that 
these two formulations of radical scepticism might be amenable to very different anti-sceptical 
resolutions.9  
 
 
  
                                                
9  For further discussion of the logical structure of sceptical arguments, with a particular emphasis on closure-based 
and underdetermination-based formulations of radical scepticism and how they relate to one another, see Yalçin 
(1992), Brueckner (1994), Cohen (1998), Byrne (2004), Vogel (2004), and Pritchard (2005a, part one; 2005b; 2015a, 
part one). 
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2. TWO SOURCES OF RADICAL SCEPTICISM 
 
I think the logical differences between these two formulations are important, in that they reveal 
two different sources of radical scepticism.  
Consider first closure-based radical scepticism. This form of scepticism exposes the 
apparent sceptical consequences of what we might naturally refer to as the ‘universality’ of rational 
evaluation, where this concerns the manner in which there is no in principle constraints on the 
extent of one’s rational evaluations (this is in contrast to practical constraints, of which there are 
usually many: time, imagination, opportunity-cost, and so on). Call this the universality of rational 
evaluation thesis. Such an idea seems to underlie closure-based radical scepticism in virtue of how 
there seems no inherent problem with the idea of extending the scope of a rational evaluation 
indefinitely by undertaking competent deductions from one’s current stock of rationally grounded 
knowledge. In this way, one moves from rational evaluations of one’s everyday beliefs to rational 
evaluations of one’s explicitly anti-sceptical commitments. In so doing, one is in effect shifting 
from a local rational evaluation to a global one, where the latter involves a wholesale rational 
assessment of one’s epistemic situation. That such a shift in epistemic focus is thought harmless 
reflects an implicit commitment to the universality of rational evaluation thesis, since without this 
in play we would not be so inclined to allow such closure-based inferences. In particular, if we 
antecedently held that there were in principle constraints on rational evaluation, then we would be 
inclined to limit such inferences so that they did not enable subjects to extend the scope of their 
rational evaluation beyond these limits.  
In contrast, underdetermination-based radical scepticism is concerned with how the 
rational support we have for our everyday beliefs in empirical propositions is troublingly weak, in 
that it does not favour these beliefs over radical sceptical alternatives. In this way, 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism exposes the ‘insularity’ of our rational support for 
these beliefs. Accordingly, call the claim that the rational support for our empirical beliefs doesn’t 
favour those beliefs over sceptical alternatives the insularity of reasons thesis. Whereas the 
universality of rational evaluation thesis is concerned with the lack of in principle constraints on 
rational evaluation, the insularity of reasons thesis is concerned with a certain limitation on rational 
support itself, at least as regards our empirical beliefs.10     
That the rational support we have for our perceptual beliefs is insular in this way is often 
taken to be a core epistemological datum which requires explanation. Indeed, the insularity of 
                                                
10  It is an interesting question how the insularity of reasons thesis relates to the ‘veil of perception’, where the latter is 
a metaphysical claim about the nature of perceptual experience (i.e., that one never directly experiences an external 
world). While I think these two theses are related, it would take me too far afield to explore this issue here.    
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reasons thesis is simply a more generalised version of the new evil demon intuition noted above 
(in that it is concerned with radical sceptical hypotheses more generally, and not a particular radical 
sceptical hypothesis). It should be clear that underdetermination-based radical scepticism buys into 
the insularity of reasons thesis without question. After all, the key element in this argument is the 
effective granting of the new evil demon intuition, for without this component one could not 
derive (S21) in the first place, and the appeal to the underdetermination principle in (S22) would be 
idle. This formulation of the radical sceptical paradox is thus essentially wedded to the insularity of 
reasons thesis.  
Although the ultimate sceptical import of the universality of rational evaluation thesis and 
the insularity of reasons thesis is the same, it is important to note that they pose distinct 
epistemological challenges. Suppose, for example, that one rejected the universality of rational 
evaluation thesis and therefore argued that there are in principle limitations on the scope of 
rational evaluation. In this way, one could argue that closure-based inferences need to be restricted 
in some way to prevent them taking the subject from local to global rational evaluations. One 
could thus undermine the closure-based radical sceptical paradox. In particular, one could hold 
that one’s rationally grounded knowledge of everyday empirical propositions is entirely compatible 
with a lack of rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses (on 
account of the fact that one cannot employ a closure-based inference in order to claim that one’s 
rationally grounded knowledge of everyday propositions, if genuine, would entail the contested 
rationally grounded anti-sceptical knowledge). 
It is far from obvious how that would help one resolve the problem posed by the insularity 
of reasons thesis, however. That one can have rationally grounded knowledge of mundane 
empirical propositions while lacking rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical 
sceptical hypotheses is one thing. That one can have adequately rationally grounded knowledge of 
mundane empirical propositions when that rational basis (one is aware) does not favour one’s 
everyday empirical beliefs over sceptical alternatives quite another. As one might put the point, if 
one’s everyday empirical beliefs do not satisfy the underdetermination principle, then in virtue of 
what, exactly, do they amount to rationally grounded knowledge? Thus, even with the closure 
principle out of action, one can still employ the underdetermination principle⎯and, thereby, the 
insularity of reasons thesis⎯to motivate a radical sceptical conclusion. 
The same is true in the other logical direction, in that merely denying the insularity of 
reasons thesis does not in itself deliver a satisfactory response to the sceptical problem posed by 
the universality of rational evaluation thesis. For suppose that one argues that one’s rational 
support can, in optimal cases say, epistemically favour one’s everyday empirical beliefs over radical 
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sceptical alternatives. The insularity of reasons thesis would thus be rejected, and the 
underdetermination principle⎯while still standing⎯would be deprived of its sceptical 
ramifications. But can one straightforwardly generate on this basis a response to the radical 
sceptical problem posed by the universality of rational evaluation thesis? Alas, no.  
For notice that the claim that one’s rational support favours one’s everyday empirical 
beliefs over radical sceptical alternatives is consistent with one nonetheless lacking rationally 
grounded knowledge of the denials of these radical sceptical alternatives. The extent to which one 
has better rational support for one’s everyday empirical beliefs over radical sceptical alternatives 
could, after all, be merely marginal, and not of a kind that could underpin rationally grounded 
knowledge of the denials of these sceptical alternatives. It follows that one could have better 
rational support for one’s everyday empirical beliefs over radical sceptical alternatives and yet 
nonetheless lack rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of these radical sceptical 
alternatives. And note that this could be so even if one further supposes that one has rationally 
grounded knowledge of these everyday propositions.  
But insofar as the rejection of the insularity of reasons thesis is compatible with a lack of 
rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses, then the radical sceptic can 
appeal to the closure principle⎯and, thereby, the universality of rational evaluation thesis⎯in 
order to call the possibility of rationally grounded everyday empirical knowledge into question. 
Thus, the mere fact that one has a better rational basis for one’s everyday empirical beliefs over 
radical sceptical alternatives will not suffice to block the closure-based radical sceptical argument. 
The upshot of the foregoing is that a fully adequate response to the problem of radical scepticism 
may well need to be sensitive to the particular challenges posed by both of the articulations of this 
problem that we have examined. As we will see below, this conclusion is potentially important in 
terms of our understanding of two prominent styles of anti-scepticism which can appear to be in 
competition with one another. In particular, it invites the thought that these two responses to the 
problem of radical scepticism may well be responding to different versions of the radical sceptical 
challenge, such that on closer inspection they are not competing anti-sceptical proposals at all, but 
rather mutually supporting. 
 
 
3. WITTGENSTEIN ON THE STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL EVALUATION 
 
We begin with the closure-based radical sceptical paradox. I contend that the antidote to this 
problem lies in a distinctive conception of the structure of rational evaluation that is offered by 
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Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty (OC).11 What is common to the 
rational evaluations undertaken by both radical sceptics and traditional anti-sceptics (such as 
Descartes or G. E. Moore) is that they each attempt a universal rational evaluation of our beliefs. 
While the sceptics conclude from this evaluation that the rational standing of our beliefs is 
insecure, the classical anti-sceptics in contrast argue that a solid rational basis for our beliefs is 
available. Where Wittgenstein diverges from both sceptical and traditional anti-sceptical proposals 
is in his contention that the very idea of a fully general rational evaluation⎯whether positive (i.e., 
anti-sceptical) or negative (i.e., sceptical)⎯is simply incoherent. He thus offers a conception of the 
structure of rational evaluation which is essentially local, and which is thus directly at odds with 
the universality of rational evaluation thesis.  
 Key to Wittgenstein’s account of the structure of rational evaluation is the idea of hinge 
commitments. These concern that which we are optimally certain of, the so-called ‘Moorean’ 
propositions, such as ‘I have two hands’. Moore (1925; 1939) noted that the optimal certainty 
which we accord to such propositions seems to allow them to play an important epistemic role our 
practices of epistemic evaluation. But while Moore thought that this optimal certainty revealed a 
special kind of epistemic status, Wittgenstein instead argues that the exact opposite is the case, in 
that our hinge commitments are essentially groundless. Indeed, not only are they essentially 
groundless, but they cannot be subject to rational doubt either. This is because they form the 
framework relative to which any rational evaluation occurs, whether positive or negative.  
 As we might expect from unedited notebooks containing impressionistic remarks, 
Wittgenstein doesn’t offer a straightforward argument for this account of our hinge commitments. 
Rather he offers a series of examples which highlight the implausibility both of doubt of a hinge 
commitment being rational and of the idea that we could regard such commitments as rationally 
grounded. Consider the following passage: 
 
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make sure by looking. If I 
were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I 
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? (OC, 
§125) 
 
Wittgenstein is suggesting that doubt of that which is optimally certain cannot be rational because 
it throws into question one’s entire system of beliefs, and thus the very putative rational basis of 
the doubt itself. Such a doubt, he writes, would “drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos.” 
(OC, §613) Doubt of a Moorean certainty is deemed akin to doubting everything, but Wittgenstein 
cautions that: 
                                                
11  Though as I’ve argued elsewhere⎯see Pritchard (2015c)⎯the ultimate source of this distinctive proposal may well 
be Newman (1870). See also Kienzler (2006).  
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If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of 
doubting itself presupposes certainty. (OC, §115) 
 
And elsewhere, “A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt.” (OC, §450; cf. OC, 
§§370; 490; 613)  
Something must thus stand fast for rational doubt to occur, and this is our bedrock of 
hinge commitments. But, crucially, Wittgenstein further argues⎯contrary to a certain brand of 
broadly Moorean anti-scepticism⎯that it does not follow that these hinge commitments have a 
special rational grounding, but rather that just as they cannot be rationally doubted, so they cannot 
be coherently thought of as rationally grounded either. Consider the following passage: 
 
My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in 
evidence for it. 
 That is why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as evidence for it. (OC, 
§250) 
 
That is, just as one cannot make sense of a rational basis for doubt of a hinge commitment, for the 
very same reason one cannot make sense of a rational basis for belief of a hinge commitment 
either. Such commitments are thus essentially arational. 
 Relatedly, Wittgenstein also emphasises the point that our hinge commitments are neither 
acquired via rational processes nor responsive to rational considerations in the way that normal 
beliefs are. We’ve already the noted the latter point, in that we’ve seen how our hinge 
commitments are simply not responsive to rational considerations in the usual way⎯e.g., they are 
not susceptible to being undermined by rational doubt. Indeed, our hinge commitments are, 
instead, completely non-optional, and represent a visceral, “animal” (OC, §359), certainty. On the 
former point, Wittgenstein points out that we are never explicitly taught our hinge commitments, 
but we rather “swallow them down” in other things that we are taught. No one teaches you that 
you have two hands, for example, but lots of things that you are taught presuppose this 
commitment. In a similar vein, Wittgenstein notes that it takes a very special kind of inquiry⎯one 
that is specifically philosophical in nature⎯to bring our hinge commitments to the fore. In the 
normal run of things, they “lie apart from the route travelled by inquiry.” (OC, §88)  
Putting all these points together, Wittgenstein argues for the necessity of hinge 
commitments for there to be rational evaluation, and thus he contends that⎯as a ‘matter of 
logic’⎯all rational evaluation is essentially local. Consider these famous remarks on our hinge 
commitments: 
 
[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are 
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 
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  That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are 
in deed not doubted. 
  But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate everything, and for that 
reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must 
stay put. (OC, §§341-3)12 
 
This point about how rational evaluation must be this way is very important to Wittgenstein’s anti-
scepticism, but it is often overlooked. Wittgenstein is quite emphatic that it is not a mere practical 
limitation on rational evaluation that he has in mind, such that if only we were cleverer, more 
imaginative, more conscientious, and so forth, then we would be able to make sense of the idea of 
a fully general rational evaluation. That these hinges stand fast for me, Wittgenstein (OC, §235) 
writes, is not “grounded in my stupidity or credulity.” (OC, §235) Rather his point is that the very 
idea of a fully general rational evaluation⎯i.e., a rational evaluation which isn’t relative to hinge 
commitments which are immune to rational evaluation⎯simply doesn’t make sense.13  
 
 
4. PUTTING THE WITTGENSTEINIAN PROPOSAL TO WORK 
 
How does this help us with the sceptical paradoxes that we encountered above? As I’ve argued 
elsewhere⎯see, especially, Pritchard (2015a)⎯the import of Wittgenstein’s account of the 
structure of rational evaluation to these paradoxes is moot, in that one needs to develop the 
proposal in very specific ways in order for it to get the required grip on the problem in hand. We 
will ignore the twists and turns in this discussion here, however, and go straight for what I believe 
is the concluding thought. This is that Wittgenstein’s proposal has direct application to the 
closure-based sceptical paradox in virtue of how it demonstrates how closure-based inferences are 
simply not applicable to our hinge commitments.  
 As noted above, in the first instance Wittgenstein’s proposal applies to the closure-based 
sceptical paradox in virtue of rejecting the universality of reasons thesis which we saw 
                                                
12  Although the “hinge” metaphor is the dominant symbolism in the book, it is accompanied by various other 
metaphors, such as the following: that these propositions constitute the “scaffolding” of our thoughts (OC, §211); that 
they form the “foundations of our language-games” (OC, §§401-3); and also that they represent the implicit “world-
picture” from within which we inquire, the “inherited background against which [we] distinguish between true and 
false” (OC, §§94-5). 
13  This point marks an important contrast between Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism and the superficially similar 
response to scepticism offered by Austin (1961). They are similar in that both emphasise the differences between 
sceptical doubt and everyday doubt. As Stroud (1984) so persuasively argued, however, it is open to the proponent of 
radical scepticism to embrace these differences while nonetheless maintaining that sceptical doubt is a purified version 
of everyday doubt (i.e., once the latter is stripped of purely pragmatic limitations, such as imagination, time, 
opportunity, ingenuity, and so on). Unlike Austin, however, Wittgenstein blocks even this move by demonstrating that 
the difference between sceptical doubt and everyday doubt is not a differences of degree but rather of kind, where one 
moves from a style of rational evaluation which is coherent to one which is simply incoherent. For further discussion 
of this point, see Pritchard (2011, §1; 2014b; 2015a, part two).   
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underpinned this formulation of the problem. If Wittgenstein is right, then there are 
limitations⎯moreover, in principle (i.e., ‘logical’) limitations, and not merely practical ones⎯on 
the extent to which one can rationally evaluate one’s propositional commitments. In particular, the 
scope of rational evaluation is constrained by the fact that all rational evaluations presuppose prior 
hinge commitments, and these cannot themselves be rationally evaluated. We should thus be very 
suspicious of the kind of closure-style inference in play in this formulation of scepticism, such that 
it takes us from treating a normal non-hinge claim as rationally grounded knowledge to treating a 
hinge commitment⎯concerning the denial of a radical sceptical hypothesis⎯as rationally 
grounded knowledge too.14  
But does that mean that Wittgenstein is rejecting the closure principle? That would at least 
seem to be the implication of his rejection of the universality of reasons thesis, since one can 
surely recognise that one’s (rationally grounded) non-hinge commitments sometimes entail one’s 
hinge commitments. If the closure principle is allowed, then how is one to resist the conclusion 
that one can gain rationally grounded knowledge of one’s hinge commitments in this case, contra 
what Wittgenstein proposes? Conversely, insofar as we grant that rationally grounded knowledge 
of one’s hinge commitments is impossible, then one seems forced to admit that there is a standing 
challenge to the idea that any of one’s normal non-hinge beliefs amount to rationally grounded 
knowledge. The trouble is, didn’t we note above that the closure principle looked entirely 
uncontentious, such that denying it would be highly revisionary?15 
 The key to resolving this issue is to realise that the closure principle is simply inapplicable 
to our hinge commitments, and hence that it cannot be used to motivate the sceptical challenge in 
play. In particular, we need to establish some logical distance between the universality of rational 
evaluation thesis and the closure principle, such that the rejection of the one doesn’t entail the 
rejection of the other. Demonstrating that the closure principle doesn’t apply to our hinge 
commitments is one way of doing this.  
 Why would closure-style inferences be inapplicable to our hinge commitments? This 
depends on what we take a hinge commitment to be. The examples that are offered of our hinge 
commitments form, on the face of it anyway, a rather heterogeneous class. That one’s name is 
such-and-such (e.g., OC, §629), that one has never been to the moon (e.g. OC, §111), that one has 
                                                
14  Proponents of a popular reading of OC⎯which I’ve elsewhere dubbed the “non-propositional reading” (e.g., 
Pritchard 2011; 2015b)⎯will dispute that the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses count as hinge commitments, 
since they will claim that such hypotheses fail to express a proposition at all. For an influential defence of such a 
reading, see Moyal-Sharrock (2004). For a helpful critical discussion, see Coliva (2010).   
15  Wittgenstein recognised this problem himself⎯see, e.g., OC, §185⎯though obviously he didn’t express the point 
in terms of the closure principle. For discussion of this point, see Pritchard (2011, §1; 2012b, §2; 2015b, §2). For a 
prominent interpretation of OC which in effect takes Wittgenstein to be rejecting closure, see Wright (2004), though 
bear in mind that he expresses this point in terms of his denial of a slightly different closure-style principle, which he 
calls ‘transmission’.  
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two hands (e.g., OC, §1), that one speaks English (e.g., OC, §486), and so on⎯these instances of 
hinge commitments seem to be very diverse in character. Moreover, the very metaphor of the 
hinge implies a kind of optionality in our hinge commitments⎯hinges, after all, are usually 
movable (e.g., if one wishes to make a door turn a different way). Putting these two points 
together, one might be tempted by an account of hinges as optional commitments that one has, 
and which can vary radically from person to person, culture to culture, historical epoch to 
historical epoch, and so on.  
 I think this is precisely the kind of picture of our hinge commitments that it is crucial to 
resist. Consider first the putative heterogeneity of our hinge commitments. I contend that this 
diversity in our hinge commitments in facts conceals a common core. For what all of our 
examples of hinge commitments in effect codify is one’s overarching conviction⎯call this the über 
hinge commitment⎯that one is not radically and fundamentally in error in one’s beliefs. If, for 
instance, if I am wrong about whether or not I have hands in otherwise normal conditions, then 
clearly my beliefs are radically and fundamentally in error. The diversity in our hinge commitments 
thus belies a common source, which is our common commitment to the über hinge.  
 I take this to be a de-mystifying account of our hinge commitments, which is clearly an 
advantage of the proposal. Moreover, it is also helps us to account for the properties that are 
attributed to our hinge commitments. The idea that one’s commitment to the über hinge needs to 
be in place before one can engage in the game of doubt and belief, and thereby undertake rational 
evaluations, is obviously very plausible. Accordingly, insofar as one grants that the examples that 
Wittgenstein focuses on⎯the Moorean certainties, broadly speaking⎯are simply codifying the 
über hinge commitment, then it is hardly surprising that they will inherit this feature.  
Furthermore, note that once we focus on the über hinge commitment it is clear why 
Wittgenstein’s point is not merely psychological.16 For while it is undoubtedly true that we cannot, 
as a matter of psychology, engage in universal doubt, and thereby lose our über hinge 
commitment, the deeper point that Wittgenstein wants to make is rather one of (as he would put 
it) ‘logic’. This is the philosophical thesis about the very nature of rational evaluation that we 
explored above⎯viz., the fundamental incoherence in the very idea of a fully general rational 
evaluation (i.e., a rational evaluation that did not already presuppose the über hinge commitment, 
and hence whatever other commitments codify the über hinge commitment).  
 Reflecting on the über hinge commitment also makes us realise what aspects of the hinge 
metaphor Wittgenstein had in mind when using this terminology. The leading idea is clearly one of 
something having to stand fast in order for rational evaluations to take place. But in using this 
                                                
16  I think this is a point that is overlooked in the naturalistic reading of OC proposed by Strawson (1985). 
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metaphor Wittgenstein wasn’t also buying into the idea of optionality that is often associated with 
hinges. Indeed, our hinge commitments are precisely non-optional, since they reflect this basic 
animal conviction that we are not radically and fundamentally in error.17 I think this point helps 
the proponent of a hinge epistemology to avoid embracing a radical form of epistemic relativism, 
such that all rational evaluation is relative to a highly variable set of hinge commitments, thereby 
allowing subjects to potentially inhabit incommensurable spheres of rational evaluation. I don’t 
think that this is part of Wittgenstein’s proposal at all, for he emphasises again and again the 
shared basis of our rational systems. As he puts it at one point, in order to be rationally explicable 
one “must already judge in conformity with mankind.” (OC, §156) Our shared language and 
practices⎯and, of course, our shared commitment to the über hinge⎯will tend to ensure a 
common thread is woven across our rational practices.18  
 A related advantage of this way of thinking about hinge commitments is that not just any 
attitude of pathological certainty will thereby count as a hinge commitment. The test is whether 
the certainty is grounded in the commitment to the über hinge. Moreover, notice that this picture 
of our hinge commitments can explain how specific hinge commitments which we hold⎯e.g., to 
having never been to the moon⎯can alter over time even though they are not directly responsive 
to rational considerations. For as our web of beliefs changes⎯as, in this case for example, space 
travel becomes more common⎯so what codifies our über hinge commitment can change also. 
This process of change can be rational, of course, but crucially it does not involve the direct 
rational evaluation of a hinge commitment.  
 So we have a particular conception of our hinge commitments on the table. How does this 
bear on the issue in hand, which is the supposed inapplicability of the closure principle to our 
hinge commitments? The answer lies in the fact that on this conception of hinge commitments it 
is clear that they cannot be beliefs, much less can they be beliefs that are acquired via a rational 
process of the kind at issue in the closure principle. More precisely, our hinge commitments are 
                                                
17  I think that certain readings of OC go awry precisely by taking the hinge metaphor too literally on just this score. 
Williams (1991), for example, clearly thinks of our hinge commitments (or ‘methodological necessities’, as he calls 
them) as if they can be, at least sometimes anyway, changed at will. For instance, he holds that changing one’s inquiry 
can change one’s hinge commitments. Similarly, Wright (2004) makes the mistake of trying to conceive of our hinge 
commitments as something akin to assumptions which we are entitled to accept due to their strategic importance in 
our inquiries (i.e., that inquiry would be stymied otherwise). But one can accept that p while being agonistic whether p, 
and yet the kind of propositional attitude that we are interested in with regard to hinge commitments is clearly not 
compatible with agnosticism whether p. I discuss both proposals in more depth in Pritchard (2015a). See also 
Pritchard (2005c; 2010; 2011; 2012b; 2014a; 2015b).   
18  The parallels between Wittgenstein on this score and Davidson’s (e.g., 1983) appeal to the principle of charity are 
striking. See Pritchard (2013) for an exploration of Davidson’s anti-scepticism. For further discussion of the topic of 
epistemic relativism in the context of OC, see Pritchard (2010), which is essentially a critique of Williams’ (2007) hinge 
epistemology on this front. In short, I argue that Williams’s inferential contextualist account of hinge commitments in 
terms of methodological necessities forces him to adopt an epistemology which is far too amenable to the threat of 
epistemic relativism. See also footnote 17. 
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not beliefs in the specific sense that epistemologists are interested in⎯viz., the propositional 
attitude which is held to be a constituent of knowledge (call this notion, knowledge-apt belief). A 
knowledge-apt believing, after all, is a believing a proposition to be true, and as such it bears certain 
essential conceptual connections to truth and to reasons. In particular, while one can obviously 
have an irrational or groundless belief, one cannot, for instance, recognise that one has no reason 
for believing p to be true and yet still count as believing p (at least not in the knowledge-apt sense 
of belief anyway). One’s propositional attitude toward p would instead amount to something else 
entirely, such as a wishful thinking. Thus insofar as we take seriously Wittgenstein’s claim that our 
hinge commitments are neither acquired via rational processes nor responsive to rational 
considerations, then they cannot plausibly be thought of as knowledge-apt beliefs at all, much less 
can they be the result of a rational process such as competent deduction.19 
  It is, however,  crucial to the formulation of the closure principle that it involves the 
acquisition of a (knowledge-apt) belief in the entailed proposition via the paradigmatically rational 
process of competent deduction. As we noted earlier, it is only if closure is understood in this way 
that it captures the idea that competent deductions from rationally grounded knowledge (where 
rationally grounded knowledge of the antecedent is maintained throughout) cannot lead to 
anything less than rationally grounded knowledge of the consequent. But if Wittgenstein is right, 
then it is simply not possible to acquire a (knowledge-apt) belief in a hinge proposition, much less 
via a rational process, and hence the sceptic cannot employ the closure principle to motivate their 
sceptical conclusion. The Wittgensteinian response to radical scepticism thus proceeds by rejecting 
the universality of reasons thesis and then further noting that the rationale for rejecting this thesis 
also undermines the sceptical application of the closure principle. In particular, in terms of our 
formulation of closure-based radical scepticism above, it is the second claim, (S12), that is denied. 
More specifically, it is maintained that one can accept the closure principle and yet nonetheless 
deny (S12), on the grounds that closure doesn’t apply to our hinge commitments and hence cannot 
be employed to generate this claim.20  
 
 
  
                                                
19  For a useful recent discussion of the notion of belief, which delineates several different ways in which this notion is 
understood in the literature, see Stevenson (2002).  
20  For further discussion of the different ways of interpreting Wittgenstein’s proposal in OC⎯of which there are 
many⎯see Pritchard (2005c; 2011; 2015b). Note, in particular, that I have not here engaged with Moyal-Sharrock’s 
(e.g., 2004) important work on OC. In particular, she makes the provocative proposal⎯which has some support in 
the text itself⎯that we are not to think of our hinge commitments as involving a propositional attitude at all. For an 
insightful discussion of her view see Coliva (2010). For some other important treatments of OC not explored here, see 
McGinn (1989), Coliva (2015), and Schönbaumsfeld (2015).   
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5. A WEAKNESS IN WITTGENSTEINIAN ANTI-SCEPTICISM 
 
While the Wittgensteinian response to radical scepticism fares well when it comes to closure-based 
radical scepticism, it struggles with underdetermination-based radical scepticism. That rational 
support is essentially local is entirely compatible, after all, with it also being ‘insular’ in the manner 
set out above⎯viz., such that one could never have rational support for one’s everyday empirical 
beliefs which favours those beliefs over sceptical alternatives. But with the insularity of reasons 
thesis in play, underdetermination-based radical scepticism seems inevitable. In short, it could both 
be true that all rational evaluation is essentially local and that the rational support which our 
empirical beliefs enjoy is also insular. Is there anything in Wittgenstein’s account of the structure 
of reasons which could block this move? 
Now one might be tempted to respond to this point by arguing that Wittgenstein’s 
account has at least indirect relevance to the underdetermination-based sceptical problem. For 
doesn’t this view rule sceptical scenarios out of the epistemic court, in virtue of the fact that their 
denials aren’t in the market for knowledge? If that’s right, then while there is nothing in 
Wittgenstein’s proposal which would suffice to show that we have the relevant favouring rational 
support for our beliefs, nonetheless there is enough to make the putative negative epistemic 
import of sceptical scenarios inherently suspect. Given that underdetermination-based scepticism 
trades on these scenarios just as much as closure-based scepticism, this would surely be bad news 
for both variants of the sceptical problem. 
But a moment’s reflection reveals that this train of reasoning, while superficially appealing, 
is far too quick. For while it’s true that closure-based scepticism and underdetermination-based 
radical scepticism both appeal to radical sceptical hypotheses, we need to bear in mind that the 
manner in which they appeal to them is very different. The closure-based sceptical argument 
demands that we must be able to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical 
sceptical hypotheses if we are to have widespread rationally grounded knowledge of everyday 
empirical propositions. The Wittgensteinian proposal we have considered deals with this form of 
scepticism by showing that our everyday rationally grounded knowledge is compatible with a 
failure to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. 
In contrast, the underdetermination-based sceptical argument doesn’t demand that we 
must be able to have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses at all, 
and hence the Wittgensteinian proposal doesn’t gain purchase here. Instead, it makes the demand 
that we must have better rational support for our empirical beliefs over sceptical alternatives if the 
former is to amount to rationally grounded knowledge. As we saw above, this is a logically weaker 
demand to make, in that one could have such favouring supporting for one’s everyday empirical 
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beliefs over sceptical alternatives even while failing to have rationally grounded knowledge of the 
denials of sceptical alternatives. And therein lies the crux of the matter. The Wittgensteinian 
proposal is that our everyday rationally grounded knowledge is fine even despite our inability to 
have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. But this is 
irrelevant to underdetermination-based radical scepticism on account of the fact that this form of 
scepticism never demanded that we should have this kind of anti-sceptical knowledge if we are to 
have everyday rationally grounded knowledge.  
The Wittgensteinian treatment of radical scepticism thus fails to engage with the 
underdetermination-based formulation of this problem. The worry that the rational support for 
our beliefs might be both local and insular is thus very real indeed. Worse, with the 
underdetermination-based formulation of the sceptical problem in play, it is surely even harder to 
be comfortable with the idea⎯which even Wittgenstein held took some getting used to (e.g., OC, 
§166)⎯of essentially local rational support. For remember what this idea means in practice⎯viz., 
that the hinge commitments which underpin our system of rational evaluation are essentially 
unknown and lacking rational support. Wittgenstein offers us a compelling story as to why we 
should accept such a claim, despite it being in tension with a certain widely held philosophical 
picture (as encapsulated in the universality of rational evaluation thesis). But once we recognise the 
danger posed by underdetermination-based scepticism, this story starts to look much less 
compelling. The idea that rational evaluation is essentially local is acceptable only so long as we 
can retain our conviction that the rational support we have for our beliefs is bona fide. But with the 
underdetermination-based sceptical problem in play, there is no assurance that such local rational 
support is genuine at all. 
 
 
6. WITTGENSTEINIAN ANTI-SCEPTICISM: WHITHER NOW? 
 
So where does this leave a Wittgensteinian epistemology? I think that given the point made earlier 
that we are dealing with two distinct sceptical arguments which trade on two distinct sources of 
scepticism, the moral to be extracted is not that there is something seriously amiss with 
Wittgensteinian anti-scepticism, but rather that we should not expect an anti-sceptical proposal to 
offer us a complete solution to the problem in hand. In particular, the goal will be to find a way of 
supplementing this proposal with a further epistemological thesis which can deal with the problem 
of underdetermination-based radical scepticism. 
It would take me too far afield to explain in detail how I think Wittgensteinian anti-
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scepticism should be supplemented to deal with both sceptical problems⎯I offer the necessary 
detail in Pritchard (2015a)⎯so I will confine my remarks to a general outline of what I have in 
mind. The first point to note, however, is that it is vitally important that any supplementation of 
the Wittgensteinian position is not a mere ‘bolting-on’ of one anti-sceptical proposal to another. 
Rather, what we seek in a philosophically satisfying response to the dual problem posed by radical 
scepticism is a dual response which is compatible, integrated, and entered in the same spirit.  
I think epistemological disjunctivism⎯a view that is rooted in the work of John McDowell (e.g., 
1995)⎯fits the bill in this regard. Very roughly, this is the proposal that in paradigm cases of 
perceptual knowledge the rational support that one’s belief enjoys can be both reflectively 
accessible and factive. In particular, one’s reflectively accessible rational support for believing that 
p can be that one sees that p, where seeing that p entails p. So construed, epistemological 
disjunctivism⎯if it can be shown to be sound anyway⎯is clearly the antidote to 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism, since it blocks from the off the insularity of reasons 
thesis that is driving this form of scepticism. In particular, with epistemological disjunctivism in 
play the opening premise of the underdetermination-based sceptical argument is rejected, since in 
the right conditions one can have a rational basis for one’s everyday perceptual beliefs which 
favours⎯indeed, decisively favours, since it is factive⎯those beliefs over radical sceptical 
alternatives.   
It should be granted from the outset that epistemological disjunctivism is a highly 
controversial position to hold. But, as I explain at length in Pritchard (2012a), the main reasons 
why this position is thought so controversial are in fact erroneous, such that this is a view that is 
available if we want it.21 Furthermore, I also argue that this proposal is rooted in our 
commonsense understanding of our epistemic practices, and hence that it is a position that we 
have only been led to abandon under pressure from faulty theoretical claims about the viability of 
the position. In a nutshell, one of the key claims of epistemological disjunctivism is that it is a view 
that we would have naturally endorsed had we not been misled by faulty philosophy. The upshot 
of this point is that this way of responding to underdetermination-based radical scepticism is an 
undercutting anti-sceptical strategy, just like the Wittgensteinian response to closure-based radical 
scepticism. That is, it is a strategy which demonstrates that what looked like a general sceptical 
paradox that traded only on our fundamental epistemological convictions was in fact nothing of 
the sort, but rather traded instead on contentious philosophical claims which we should reject. 
This is important, since it demonstrates the epistemological disjunctivism and Wittgensteinian 
                                                
21  See also Neta & Pritchard (2007) and Pritchard (2008; 2015a, part three).  
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anti-sceptical are entered in very much the same philosophical spirit.22  
Furthermore, note that despite the very different nature of these proposals, they are clearly 
consistent with one another. That rational evaluation is in its nature local is entirely consistent with 
the possibility that some rational support is factive. And that some rational support is factive is 
entirely consistent with the possibility that rational evaluation is in its nature local. These proposals 
are also mutually supporting. If we ally epistemological disjunctivism to Wittgensteinian anti-
scepticism, then we can explain how the latter can deal with the problem posed by 
underdetermination-based radical scepticism. And if we ally Wittgensteinian anti-scepticism to 
epistemological disjunctivism, then we can explain how the latter can avoid the epistemic 
immodesty of claiming that we can have rationally grounded knowledge⎯indeed, factively rationally 
grounded knowledge⎯of the denials of sceptical hypotheses. After all, it will now follow that 
closure-type inferences are simply inapplicable to our hinge commitments.  
Moreover, notice it is easier to live with the Wittgensteinian idea that all rational evaluation 
is local if some rational support is factive. And (as we’ve just noted) it is easier to live with the idea 
that some rational support is factive if it doesn’t entail that one can have rationally grounded 
knowledge of the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. These are two proposals which are both 
stronger when grouped together, rather than considered separately. 
I call this resolution to the problem of radical sceptical problem a biscopic proposal. The 
point is that we have hitherto failed to see the problem aright⎯in particular, we have failed to 
recognise its dual nature⎯and hence we have failed to see how this problem requires a dual 
solution. We have, if you will, been looking at the problem through only one eye at a time. But 
once we view the problem properly, and so see both of its aspects, then we can mount an 
integrated dual solution that offers philosophical satisfaction, and which is hence a cure for 
epistemic angst (of this variety anyway). That is precisely what this biscopic proposal offers us.23 
                                                
22  For more on undercutting anti-sceptical strategies⎯as opposed to overriding anti-sceptical strategies⎯see Pritchard 
(2014b; 2015a, part one). For some important and related discussions of how to classify different kinds of anti-
sceptical proposals, see Williams (1991, ch. 1) and Cassam (2007).    
23  Thanks to Annalisa Coliva and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock.  
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